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Abstract: This paper traces the roots of the emergence of 
Islamic religious and political movements in Indonesia 
especially during and after their depoliticization during the 
New Order regime. There were two important impacts of 
the depoliticization, first, the emergence of various study 
groups and student organizations in university campuses. 
Second, the emergence of Islamic political parties after the 
fall of Suharto. In addition, political freedom after long 
oppression also helped create religious groups both radical 
on the one hand and liberal  on the other. These radical 
and liberal groups were not only intellectual movements 
but also social and political in nature. Although the present 
confrontation between liberal and moderate Muslims could 
lead to serious conflict in the future, and would put the 
democratic atmosphere at risk, the role of the majority of 
the moderates remains decisive in determining the course 
of Islam and politics in Indonesia.  
Keywords: Islamic religious-political movement, liberal 
Islam, non-liberal Indonesian Muslims. 
Introduction 
The rise of Islamic political parties and Islamic religious 
movements after the fall of Suharto was not abrupt in manner. The  
process was gradual, involving numbers of national and global factors. 
                                                 
1 The earlier version of this paper was presented at the conference “Islam and Asia: 
Revisiting the Socio-Political Dimension of Islam,” jointly organized by Japan Institute 
of International Affairs (JIIA) and Institute of Islamic Understanding Malaysia (IKIM), 
15-16 October, Tokyo. 
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Under the Sukarno and Suharto regimes, Muslim students’ and 
political movements suffered political oppression, but this merely had 
the effect of encouraging Muslims to mobilize themselves through 
underground organizations and movements. The resignation of 
President Suharto and the succession of his Vice President, B.J. 
Habibie in 1998 marked the end of four decades of authoritarian rule 
and the beginning of democratization in Indonesian politics. The era 
of authoritarian rule, with considerable restriction and repression in 
socio-political life, was subsequently replaced by the so-called 
Reformation Era with its extravagant euphoria of freedom. Repression 
against Muslim and other groups decreased somewhat under the 
Habibie regime and dramatically under the regime of Abdurrahman 
Wahid. Habibie started by lifting the existing ban on the number of 
political parties and announced that a general election would be held 
within a year. He also abolished the regulation of the media. Wahid, 
who was later known as a pluralist figure, began by lifting the ban on 
ex-communist party members participating in social and political 
activities.2 The situation became considerably more conducive for the 
rise of diverse movements of various ideologies, the two most 
interesting being the rise of Islamic political parties, and the emergence 
of Muslim groups regarded as taking extreme positions either radical 
extremist group or extreme liberal groups. This paper will analyze the 
rise of those movements from their background, the present situation, 
and finally, the future.  
Brief Historical Background 
Studies on the current rise of political Islam in Indonesia 
presuppose the study of the longstanding historical process of the 
Muslim struggle in building a nation state, prior to and after 
independence. Indonesia is the world’s largest Muslim population and 
is the world’s fourth most populous nation overall. It embraces within 
its territorial boundaries the largest concentration of Muslims in the 
world. From its total population of more than 210 million, 87% are 
listed as Muslim. Moreover, as the religion of the majority, Islam and 
its institutions historically played a pivotal role in mobilizing and 
organizing the masses against the colonialist power. Prior to 
                                                 
2 After he steps down from his power Wahid appreciate the launching the publication 
of the translated Karl Marx book Das Capital. The students who were present at the 
event commented that Islam should learn from communism.  
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independence Islamic organizations in Indonesia were also among 
those who spearheaded the Indonesian nationalist movements. 
Countless Muslim politicians, educators, social and religious leaders 
and others took part in the struggle for Indonesian independence. The 
establishment of Syarikat Islam in early 1920s, comprising Muslim 
traders from Java and Sumatra, provides evidence of such social 
mobilization. In addition, traditional educational institutions, like 
pesantren with their religious scholars (ulama >), also displayed a 
remarkable ability to mobilize forces against the Dutch colonialists. 
The formation and collaboration of PETA (National Defenders) and 
Hizbullah (The Army of God) during the Japanese occupation bear 
further witness to this.3  
After independence Muslims were the key actors in the formation 
of the new state and even in the building of the nation as a whole. 
However, these Islamic social movements, like Islam itself, were not 
monolithic. Rather, the movements were comprised of a diverse array 
of Muslim actors with different goals and myriad means by which they 
sought to achieve their objectives. Some social movements might seek 
an Islamic state by winning elections, others attempted to implement 
Islamic laws among the Muslim community, others sought to improve 
the system of Islamic education through establishing schools, 
universities, or training centers, while other groups aimed to create 
their own economic systems and the like. In short, Islam became the 
major impetus and the unifying factor of the Indonesian nation that 
formed the Indonesian state. However, after long debate among the 
founding fathers of Indonesia the idea of an Islamic state supported by 
Muslim leaders was rejected in favor of a unitary state.  
In the early twentieth century two important organizations were 
established. First, Muhammadiyah, which was formed in 1912 to assert 
reformist or “modern” Islamic ideals. To date, it is the second largest 
Islamic organization in the country and has 9,527 educational 
institutions of various types, and 3,775 health and welfare-related 
centers. Second as a counterweight to Muhammadiyah, in 1926 an 
organization reflecting the traditionalist outlook was established under 
the name Nahdatul Ulama (literally, “revival of the religious teachers, ” 
                                                 
3 For the history of PETA and Hizbullah formation, see Harry J. Benda, the Crescent on 
the Rising Sun, Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945 (Netherlands: The 
Hague - W. Van Hoeve, 1958).  
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but commonly referred to as the Muslim Scholars' League). This 
organization is now the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia, 
claiming to have hundreds of traditional schools (pesantren) and 30 
million supporters. It runs schools and community associations 
throughout the country. Interestingly, the founders of both NU and 
Muhammadiyah graduated from Saudi Arabia in 19th century, during 
which time Mecca and Medina were the centers of traditional learning. 
They were known to hold and practice a fundamental teaching of 
Islam, but not necessarily “fundamentalist” in the Western sense of the 
term. During the struggle for Indonesian independence, which was 
finally declared in 1945, the prominent figures of these two 
organizations became committee members for the preparation of 
Indonesian Independence (PPKI). 
After the proclamation of Indonesian independence in 1945, a 
large number of competing parties emerged. Among these parties 
Masyumi (Indonesian Muslim Consultative Council) was in a strong 
position. Masyumi was a federation of Islamic parties and 
organizations, including Muhammadiyah, Syarekat Islam and Nahdlatul 
Ulama. Its leader was Mohammad Natsir who during the early period 
of parliamentary democracy (1950 - 1957) became Prime Minister 
(from September 1950 to March 1951). Within the first decade, strains 
among the party members begun to emerge. Syarekat Islam party (in 
1948) and Nahdatul Ulama (in 1950) withdrew from Masyumi. 
Nonetheless, in 1955 election Masyumi still won 22 percent of 
parliamentary vote, equal to forty-four seats. However, due to the 
hostility of party members toward Sukarno, the party was then banned 
in 1960.4  
During the New Order regime, under the leadership of Suharto, 
the Muslim parties were oppressed. Pancasila was established as the 
state ideology and Suharto expressed his intention to do away with 
parties based on religion. He then decided to reduce the number of 
                                                 
4 Since then Natsir change his activity into social movement. He established the Dewan 
Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesian Council for Islamic Propagation). It is an 
organization for the propagation of Islam, set up in 1968. Under the leadership of 
Natsir, who was also appointed as vice-president of the World Muslim Congress, the 
Council received financial support from the Saudi Arabia government. However, after 
his death the council receives no more financial support from the Saudis. For the 
explication of political development in these years see H. Faith, The Decline of 
Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornel University Press, 1962), esp. 
chapter 9 & 10. 
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political parties. In the 1971 general election there were nine parties, 
four of them Muslim parties (PMI, NU, PSII, Tarbiyah). In 1973 the 
government merged these four parties into a single body identified by 
a name that had nothing to do with Islamic aspiration, the United 
Development Party (PPP). At the same time it merged five minority 
parties including the Catholic party, the Protestant party and the 
remnant of the former Indonesian Nationalist Party to form the 
Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). Finally came the party that 
supported the government; Golkar. Thus, the number of parties at a 
single stroke was reduced to three parties, signaling the end of parties 
based on religious ideology.  
Aside from the political situation in 1970s, there occurred, 
particularly among the Indonesian Muslims and generally among the 
youth in the Muslim world, certain mass religious phenomena,. In 
Indonesia these were called ‘santri-ization’,5 which means the increase 
of religious consciousness in Muslim society. This increasing public 
practice of their Islamic faith, like the consciousness to attend Friday 
prayers at the mosque, for women to wear the jilbab/tudung (Muslim 
head dress) and for Muslims to eat separately from non-Muslim 
colleagues has also characterized Malaysian and Singaporean Muslims. 
Although this change might be on the level of religious practice and 
not necessarily on religious thought or the substance of religious belief, 
it marked the rise of a greater awareness of Islam's global identity. 
Therefore, it should not be surprising that these phenomena occurred 
simultaneously with the growing support for the Palestinian cause. 
Thus, the increase of religious practices grew simultaneously with a 
global political awareness.  
However, these phenomena suggest only religious identification, 
and cannot be generalized as the emergence of transnational terrorist 
networks nor the desire to establish exclusionist Islamic states in 
Southeast Asia. Usually observers correlate the phenomena with the 
1979 Iranian Revolution or Wahha>bi >’s school of thought. Indeed, the 
evidence that Wahha>bi >-inspired ideas have been promoted in Pakistan, 
Afghanistan and Central Asia in the last thirty years through a variety 
                                                 
5 The santri refers to students of religious education institution named pesantren, seen as 
devout Muslims compared to the abangan nominal Muslims. In reality, this Clifford 
Geertz’s old divisions are not so stark for there is a continuum that reflects the diverse 
practice of Islam in Muslim society. The discussion of the term in this article, however, 
refers to Koentjaraningrat, Javanese Culture (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985). 
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of semi-official and official actors is undeniable. One would assume 
that the Taliban movement was “the final and the most formidable 
product of this long term strategy of Wahhabism.”6 However, so far 
Muslims in these areas remained Hanafi adherents and, in Southeast 
Asia, are Shafii strong holders. In Southeast Asia the Wahhabi 
influence can also be seen in the emergence of the group called Salafi, 
but it has nothing to do with the rise of religious movements, let alone 
the current political movement, since the school forbids its members 
to join any political activity. The spread of the Shi‘ah school of thought 
from Iran to South and Southeast Asia is also a irrefutable fact, but 
Muslims in these areas are still predominantly Sunni and not Shi‘i like 
the Iranians. So the phenomena can hardly be traced from a single 
cause, or be inferred as the rise of extremism and radicalism. John L 
Esposito regards it as Islamic revivalism and a global reassertion of 
Islam that had already been under way and that extends from Libya to 
Malaysia.7 
Muslims under Oppression 
The above phenomena can be traced back to the Suharto regime, 
which can be appraised in two periods: first, from the late 1960s until 
the late 1980s and second from 1980 until the 1990s. In the first period 
the Suharto regime practiced highly indiscriminate repressive policies 
against Islamic organizations and sought to diffuse the Islamic threat 
by imposing ideological conformity on the majority of Islamic groups 
permitted to act politically. In the second period, Suharto permitted 
somewhat greater political openness (inclusion), and engaged in 
cosmetic competitive institution building. At the same time he also 
continued to apply repressive policies against Islam and any groups 
that posed a threat.  
In the first period, that is to say the first two decades of the New 
Order regime, Suharto imposed strict controls on Islamic political 
organizations, as part of a systematic effort to depoliticize society and 
weaken the party system. After crushing the communists in 1965, 
Islamic extremists became the military’s enemy number one. Since the 
                                                 
6 Shireen T. Hunter, “Religion, Politics and Security in Central Asia,” SAIS Review, 21, 
No. 2 (Summer-Fall 2001), pp. 72-81.  
7 John L. Esposito, “Political Islam: Beyond the Green Menace,” The Journal Current 
History, January (1994). 
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military had had to suppress a series of Muslim revolts from 1948-
1962, military officials had been thoroughly indoctrinated in the threat 
of Islamic extremism.8 Outside of its official corporatist institutions, 
the Suharto regime was intensely suspicious of Islamic groups and as 
such, religious extremists and their views were suppressed. Suharto’s 
policy towards Islamic groups mirrored that of the Dutch colonial 
administration: it encouraged faith in Islam but ruthlessly repressed any 
political manifestations.9  
In order to achieve these goals Suharto channeled Islamic group 
interests into nonparty national government-controlled associations 
like the Indonesian Council of Ulamas (MUI), the Indonesian Mosque 
Council (DMI) and the Indonesian Dakwah Council (MDI). The aim 
was to keep political participation and interest demands low by 
channeling group interest into state-supervised structures and locking 
them out of power-sharing agreements.10 It was also to demobilize, 
depoliticize and force Muslim groups go underground.  
Towards the existing political parties Suharto applied the same 
strategy. He realized that there were numerous cleavages within the 
Islamic movement, with some parties, most notably Masyumi and its 
successor, Parmusi, favoring an Islamic state, while other parties wanted 
Indonesia to remain a Muslim country but not one governed under 
shariah law. In the wider political sphere, Suharto was also aware that 
Sukarno’s supporters and other nationalist parties were still dangerous 
to his power and should be marginalized. Therefore in 1974 he allowed 
only three parties to compete in the following 1977 elections: four 
Islamic parties were forced to merge in to the Unity Development 
Party (PPP), non-Islamic parties, like PNI, were fused together as the 
Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), and most significantly a 
government party was formed by the armed forces, the Joint 
Secretariat of Functional Groups (Golkar). Golkar was given primacy 
in rallying popular support for Suharto. Overall party influence was 
also minimized by restricting the parties’ role in the newly established 
                                                 
8 Michael Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Suharto (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 127. 
9 Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 121; 
Vatikiotis, Indonesian, p. 120; R. William Liddle, Leadership and Culture in Indonesian Politics 
(Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1996), p. 621. 
10 Donald Porter, Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 4; 
Liddle, Leadership, p. 615. 
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legislative bodies, the DPR, and the MPR. About 20% of members 
were directly appointed by the government including representatives of 
the armed forces. 
Merging Islamic parties into one Partai Persatuan Pembagunan (PPP), 
the Suharto regime forced it to abandon its Islamic symbol on the 
electoral ballot, and replaced the names of the parties with a single 
non-religious party name.11 The next step was to impose ideological 
conformity on Islamic political parties, organizations and state- 
chartered religious institutions; all had to make Pancasila their operating 
and organizing principle.12 This strategy greatly contributed to the 
depoliticization of certain Islamic groups, a phenomenon that Donald 
Porter describes as effective in damaging religious organizations.13 This 
action was supposed to bring religious groups under state management 
and eliminate any unmediated Islamist tendencies.14 However, those 
groups which refused to give up their Islamic ideology and replace it 
by Pancasila went underground and operated covertly through informal 
networks, cell networks and through local mosques to avoid 
government retaliation.  
At the university level, Suharto imposed this form of oppression 
through a “normalization policy,” (Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus-
NKK) which sought to depoliticize campus life by restricting the 
activities of student organizations and requiring students to focus 
entirely on their studies. In order to sufficiently depoliticize campus 
life, the government introduced the concept of the three duties of 
tertiary educational institutions: expertise, responsibility and 
corporateness. Moreover, it replaced independent student bodies and 
university student councils with administration-dominated “activity 
coordination bodies” and prohibited Islamic student organizations 
from conducting their activities on campus; only the coordination 
bodies were permitted to represent the students. This strategy was also 
applied to social organization and become an effective measure to 
exclude Islamic organizations from political participation and an 
important mechanism of the state and the military’s management and 
                                                 
11 Liddle, Leadership, p. 611; Porter, Managing, p. 39. 
12 The five principles of the Pancasila are belief in one god, humanitarian justice, unity 
of Indonesia, democracy by deliberation and consensus, and social justice for all. 
13 Porter, Managing, p. 39. 
14 Ibid. 
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supervision of society as well as vehicles for the controlled 
mobilization of Indonesian people into state-guided political and 
economic projects.15 
Besides “the normalization” policy of student life in university 
campuses and depoliticizing the Muslims, the New Order of Suharto 
attempted to shape Indonesian Islam so that it was supportive of 
government development programs. He utilized Muslim intellectuals 
to legitimize the program by quietly giving approval to an Islamic 
Renewal (Pembaruan) movement led by Nurcholish Madjid, the 
president of the National Organization of Islamic Students (Himpunan 
Mahasiswa Islam or HMI) and Harun Nasution, the Rector of State 
Institute of Islamic Studies, IAIN). The most crucial concept in 
Madjid’s Islamic political viewpoint was that of secularization,16 while 
in Nasution’s it was that of rationalization. In line with his 
secularization concept, in 1970 the former provoked heated 
controversy when he called for Islam to be separated from politics 
with the slogan “Islam Yes, Islamic Parties No.”17 The Renewal 
movement emphasized the interpretation of scripture in application to 
the modern world and the realization of Islamic values in personal life 
rather than through political parties.  
Madjid’s slogan, which he claimed to be a real depiction of Muslim 
society in Indonesia, was more imaginary than reality. In fact, the 
Islamic organizations responded to the Suharto regime’s policies in a 
variety of ways. Muslim thinkers adopted a flexible approach weaving 
between official suspicion of Islam and the conservative tendencies of 
ulama. Some key dakwah groups, most notably Muhammadiyah and 
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) chose to depoliticize and withdraw from politics 
                                                 
15 Ibid., p. 33; 57. 
16 The idea was proclaimed after his short visit to the United States, in the late 1960s. 
After a year or two Madjid proclaimed that Islam is secular religion and offered the 
concept secularization (sekularisasi) in the religious life of Muslims. The concept that 
he claimed to be his own was duplicated from Harvey Cox’s concept of secularization 
in his renowned work The Secular City, the most popular book in the US in the late 60s. 
The book is Cox’s attempt to prove that Christianity is in line with modernity, a point 
that Madjid took to support the government development program. 
17 Nurcholish Madjid’s speech was entitled, “Keharusan Pembaruan Pemikiran Islam dan 
Masalah Integrasi Umat” [The Necessity of Renewing Islamic Thought and the Problem 
of the Integration of the Islamic Community]. An English translation of the speech 
can be found in Charles Kurzman, (ed.), Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), pp. 284-9. 
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to focus on education and social welfare concerns. Other Islamists 
compromised their own beliefs to attain government sanction, but this 
did not diminish their popular support. Since they were unable to 
promote a political Islamist dogma, many Islamic scholars would hide 
their ideas in notions of social welfare.18 
On the other hand, the Suharto regime, in the early 1990s, adopted 
a program to send lecturers of Islamic higher educations to western 
centers of Islamic studies in Canada, the United States and the United 
Kingdom. This was to steer them away from the main centers in the 
Middle East,19and at the same time to disseminate liberal thought 
among Muslim intellectuals. This program was quite instrumental in 
enhancing the rise liberalism in the future. This phenomenon will be 
dealt with later.  
The second period of Suharto regime was marked by a strategy of 
political openness.  In order to seek to ward off challenges to his rule, 
Suharto drew on support from incorporated Muslim interests. This led 
to a state-Islamic accommodation and a simultaneous regime-initiated 
political opening through which Islamic groups remobilized after two 
decades of regime-enforced depoliticization. With the Islamic revival, 
Suharto saw an opportunity to play the Islam card against members of 
the military and civilian elites who might challenge his rule.20 The 
major action Suharto took during this period was his sanctioning of 
the formation of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals 
(ICMI), in December 1990. This was an organization comprised of 
Muslim intellectuals, bureaucrats and activists, both pro- and anti-
military, both pro- and anti-Suharto. The association was chaired by 
the Minister of Research and Technology B.J. Habibie, with Suharto as 
its patron. However, ICMI was never meant to be an autonomous 
organization democratically representing the political interests of 
Indonesian Muslims to their government. Instead, it was a state 
corporatist organization, dominated by high officials closely allied with 
President Suharto, whose main policy slogan was one of human 
resource development and whose chief political enemies were neither 
radicals nor Christians, but market-oriented economists.21  
                                                 
18 Vatikiotis, Indonesian, p. 129; Hefner, Civil Islam, p. 121. 
19 Vatikiotis, Indonesian, p. 127. 
20 Porter, Managing, p. 4; Hefner, Civil Islam, p. 121. 
21 Liddle, Leadership, p. 625. 
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Suharto’s political openness, drawing on support from 
incorporated Muslim interests, also brought about an increase in santri 
participation in the Suharto administration. Accordingly, when Habibie 
ascended to the Presidency of Indonesia in May 1998, following 
Suharto’s resignation in the aftermath of the anti-Chinese riots, leading 
Muslim activists were appointed to key positions in Habibie’s 
administration.22 
As a result of this short period of political openness, roughly from 
1990-1994, myriad Islamic groups remobilized and Islamic political 
leaders, such as Abdurrahman Wahid, began openly criticizing the 
state.23 This brief window of political tolerance, followed by a 
repressive clampdown on political activism, had an unintended 
consequence: it raised people’s expectations for change. Not 
surprisingly, Islamic student organizations were at the forefront. 
Mosques served as the main organizing centers because they permitted 
students to organize activities out of the purview of the state and its 
corporatist institutions. In other words, the state could not control the 
Islamic organizations. By 1996, the diverse array of Islamic 
organizations and oppositional activity had grown intolerable for the 
Suharto regime and they turned back to repressive policies.24  
In sum, the strategy of using indiscriminate repression and 
targeting Suharto’s enemies rather than dangerous groups initiating 
disturbances did not succeed in demobilizing the Islamic organizations. 
It even brought about the rise of Islamic political movements. Because 
the regime limited political participation, Muslims were driven to form 
underground organizations with informal networks, employing cell 
structures to escape the watchful eyes of the state. These organizations 
were widely formed in university campuses throughout Indonesia. 
Therefore, by 1998, when the autocratic leader, President Suharto 
                                                 
22 For a discussion of the transition from Soeharto to Habibie, see Leo Suryadinata, “A 
Year of Upheaval and Uncertainty: The Fall of Soeharto and the Rise of Habibie,” 
Southeast Asian Affairs (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999), pp. 111-
127. Soeharto’s overtures to the Muslim community is covered in Robert W. Hefner, 
“Islam, State, and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for the Indonesian Middle 
Class,” Indonesia No. 56 (1993): pp. 1-35 and R. William Liddle, “The Islamic turn in 
Indonesia: A Political Explanation,” the Journal of Asian Studies, 55, no. 3 (August 1996): 
pp. 613-634. 
23 Hefner, Civil Islam, p. 162. 
24 Porter, Managing, p. 172; pp. 198-199. 
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stepped down from power, some Muslim groups were at the forefront 
of demands for democracy. 
The Impact on Student Movements 
The global political situation and the oppressive depoliticization 
strategy applied by Suharto regime described above brought about 
consequences. According to Tilly’s theory, repression can raise 
collective action among the opposition,25 and such actions as riots, 
rebellion and revolution may target government agents.26 Meanwhile, 
Tarrow assumes that the outcome of repression in authoritarian 
systems can either demobilize or radicalize collective action.27 The 
theories of Tilly and Tarrow were proven in the emerging riots and 
protests of people power in the Reformation Era, prior to the 
resignation of Suharto in 1998 that later on became social and political 
movements. However, for Muslims, social and political movements 
were driven not only by political oppression but also by religious 
obligation, that to study Islam and to teach it to others as well as to 
practice it in daily life are parts of Islamic dakwah. In addition, the 
national and international situation played a pivotal role in influencing 
the students minds.  
Now, we shall trace the consequences of both the international 
situation and Suharto’s oppressive policy on student life and thought. 
These activities were the embryo of the Islamic movement that 
subsequently became the one mobilization vehicles of Islamic political 
parties.  
The impact of the “Normalization of Campus” policy was the shift 
of political activity to the dakwah movement. Muslim students 
movements were not depoliticized easily; many went underground and 
mosques became the new foci of politico-religious activities and 
discussion groups that helped to fuel the Islamic awakening.28 Student 
centers became quiet and all the activity was channeled to the 
                                                 
25 Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley 
Publishing, 1978), p. 100. 
26 Charles Tilly, Politics of Collective Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), p. 28. 
27 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Collective Action in Politics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 92. 
28 Porter, Managing, p. 2; Liddle, Leadership, p. 157; p. 624. 
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mosque.29 “People need a channel for their political aspirations and 
they will find it where they can” says Rizal Ramly, former student of 
ITB, Bandung.30 All activities in the mosque were operated 
underground or with a low profile. In the late 1970s the study of Islam 
was influenced by the spirit of the Iranian Revolution,31 but not of the 
Shiite school of thought. The spirit of Islamic revival was so great that 
many students became curious to learn about Islam. In Salman 
Mosque, for example, students were inspired by the fiery sermons of 
Imaddudin. At Salahuddin Gajah Mada University Amin Rais, 
Syaifullah Mahyuddin and others were important figures of student 
dakwah activities, at Airlangga University in Surabaya, Dr. Fuad 
Amsyari was the most prominent figure. The dakwah movement 
quickly spread to mosques of other universities, where Qur’an study 
groups were established. Therefore, the terms employed for naming 
their study group were usroh (nuclear family), halaqah (a circle of 
students and their teacher), and tarbiyah (education under a teacher 
who provides moral guidance). The subject matter focused primarily 
on inculcating religious morality for those who had no background of 
Islamic studies. However, it developed into politic and civil society 
studies. 
In the 1980s, university mosques or mosque around the 
universities became the center of Islamic learning of secular 
universities.32 Although the groups that were part of this movement 
                                                 
29 Salman mosque at ITB Bandung, Salahuddin mosque at Gajah Mada University of 
Jogjakarta, and Arif Rahman Hakim mosque at University of Indonesia in Jakarta, are 
few examples of university mosques. 
30 This refers to the statement of an economist Rizal Ramli when he was student of 
ITB Bandung, as quoted by Elizabeth Fuller Collins, Fulbright Visiting Fellow 
Universitas Islam Negeri Syarif Hidayatullah in his unpublished paper Dakwah and 
Democracy; The Significance of Partai Keadilan and Hizbut Tahrir. 
31 Ali Syariati (1933-1977) was the most influential intellectual leader of the Iranian 
Revolution. He had studied in France and was influenced by Third World and Left 
intellectuals such as Jean-Paul Sartre, Che Guevarra, and Frantz Fanon (Kepel 2002, 
37-8). He transposed Marxist language of class struggle into an Islamic vocabulary, 
distinguishing the mostakbirine (the arrogant) and the mostadafine (the disinherited or 
oppressed).  
32 See V.S. Naipaul, Among the Believers: An Islamic Journey (London: A. Deutsch, 1981) 
for a description of a dakwah session at Salman Mosque and Beyond Belief: Islamic 
Excursions Among the Converted Peoples (New York: Random House, 1998). The usroh 
movement was strong in the Syuhada Mosque and the Shalauddin mosque at Gadjah 
Mada University in Yogyakarta and the Arif Rahman Hakim Mosque at the University 
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did not relate themselves with political activities, they were mostly of 
the opinion that the government was corrupt and unjust. 
Internationally they also shared the view that westernization and 
secularism were going on throughout the Muslim world and should be 
prevented. Nevertheless, their spirit to learn and practice Islam was so 
great that they were open to any idea or school of thought brought by 
their tutors.  
While university students were actively involved in studying Islam 
from whatever sources they could find, students returning to Indonesia 
after studying in the Middle East provided new leadership to the 
dakwah movement. Various ideas and thoughts were brought home by 
the graduates of Middle East Universities. They can be categorized into 
at least four streams.  
The first stream was the thought of the Muslim Brotherhood 
(Ikhwa >n al-Muslimu >n). It is the best known political movement in Egypt. 
The works Hassan Al Banna, Mustafa Masyhur, and Sa’id Hawwa were 
translated into Bahasa Indonesia and became the core texts of dakwah 
activists. 
A second stream of dakwah represents the Salafy school of thought33 
of Saudi Arabia. This stream was initially used to prevent the influence 
of revolutionary Shiism from Iran. The study group that focused on 
Salafy school of thought was concentrated at Universitas Indonesia, 
IKIP Jakarta (Now become Jakarta State University), Universitas 
Trisakti, and other Jakarta institutions of higher learning.  
Later this group established an institute for dakwah development, 
Lembaga Pengkajian dan Pengembangan Dakwah (LPPD), to extend 
the reach of dakwah from university campuses to neighboring 
mosques in areas such as Jabotabek, the industrial zone around Jakarta. 
                                                                                                      
of Indonesia in Jakarta. See John Malcolm Brownlee, “Scripturalism and Religious 
Liberalism on Yogyakarta Campuses,” (Unpublished MA thesis, Ohio University, 
1997). 
33 Wahha>bi> refers to Muh}ammad bin `Abd al-Wahha>b (1703-1792), leader of an 
Islamic reform movement in Saudi Arabia. Salafy, which refers to devout ancestors or 
to the Prophet and his companions or the first pious generation, is an Islamic 
movement of the second half of the 19th c. inspired by the writings of the Sayyid 
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897) of Persia, the Egyptin Muhammad Abduh (1849-
1905), and the Syrian Rashid Rida (1865-1935). Salafy teachers also draw on the 
teachings of Ibn Taymiyyah (1268-1328), who distinguished between the realm of 
Islam and the realm of jahiliyyah (a state of ignorance or barbarism) and called for 
jihad against the “un-Islamic” Muslim rulers. 
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In the 1990s this group extended its activities to Kalimantan, Riau, 
NTT, and Irian Jaya, utilizing the network of Dakwah Institutions for 
Campuses (Lembaga Dakwah Kampus or LDK) graduates who went 
to work in different parts of Indonesia.  
Hizbut Tahrir (HT) is yet a third stream of dakwah that was 
established in Indonesia in the 1980s.34 Hizbut Tahrir was introduced 
to Indonesia by Abdurrahman Al-Baghdadi, the leader of Hizbut 
Tahrir in Australia, who moved to Bogor at the invitation of KH 
Abdullah bin Nuh, the head of Al Ghazali Pesantren. The movement 
spread from the Bogor Agricultural Insitute (Insitut Pertanian Bogor 
or IPB) to other universities in Java (Padjadjaran University in 
Bandung, IKIP Malang, and Airlangga University in Surabaya) and to 
Hasanuddin University in Makassar through the LDK movement. 
Until the fall of Suharto, Hizbut Tahrir was almost an underground 
movement. Few reports of their activities appeared in the media until 
2001. Hizbut Tahrir claims to have 100,000 members with divisions in 
every province. Sidney Jones notes that HT has grown more rapidly 
than other radical Islamic groups, particularly in certain locations, such 
as South Sulawesi. 35 
Hizbut Tahrir (HT) emphasized an educational (or moral) 
movement. The aim of dakwah was to show that Islam provided a 
solution to the multiple problems that confronted society. They also 
believed that Islamic societies would become strong and respected if 
syariah law were established. The vision of establishing a khilafa 
(chaliphate) was both a source of strength and weakness to the 
movement. Many young people were attracted to HT because of its 
revolutionary ideal and the argument that Islam was no longer a 
                                                 
34 Hizbut Tahrir (also transcribed H{izb ut-Tahri>r) was founded in 1953 by Sheikh 
Taqiyuddin An-Nabhahani (also transcribed Taqi> al-Di>n al-Nabha>ni>) in Jerusalam in 
1953. Nabhahani was a member Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwa>n al-Muslimu>n), who was 
ousted from the movement for his views. He argued that Shari>'ah (Islamic law) was the 
key to restoring the greatness of Islamic civilization. In his view the focus on ethical 
teaching of Islam that typified the Muslim Brotherhood and other dakwah movements 
drained energy away from the political struggle: “The passions of the ummah have 
been defused by these boring, cheap and repetitive discourses . . . Nations are not 
[judged] by morality or ethics but by the faiths they embrace and the ideas they adopt 
and the systems they implement.” Translation by Azzam Tamimi, “Hizbut-Tahrir 
Reflections on its origin and its ideas,” http://www.ii-pt.com/web/papers/tahrir.htm. 
35 Sadanand Dhume, “Hizbut Tahrir Using War in Iraq to Seek Converts,” Far Eastern 
Economic Review, April 3, (2003). 
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powerful force in world politics because Muslims had been divided by 
a nation-state system and democracy imposed by the West. For them, 
democracy as a Western form of government, was rejected, and 
involvement in the politics of a secular state was regarded as a useless 
diversion, therefore its members were not allowed to get involved in 
the current political system. It was for this rejection of the nation-state 
and democracy that Hizbut Tahrir could be considered the most 
revolutionary stream of dakwah, yet the movement still operated within 
democratic parameters and no subversive action against the 
government was taken. Unlike Salafy and other dakwah activists, their 
concern with studying Islamic thought was particularly serious. Critics, 
however, found the goals of Hizbut Tahrir unrealistic.  
In fact, it was Hizbut Tahrir that initiated the establishment of a 
network of dakwah activists from the university campuses of LDK. 
LDK held its first gathering (Silaturahmi) in 1988. In the 1990s the 
LDK conducted regular recruitment campaigns among incoming 
students. By the early 1990s, most of the LDK were led to form the 
Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa 
Muslim Indonesia or KAMMI), the organization of Islamic students in 
support of the Reformasi movement to bring down Suharto. Both HT 
and KAMMI agreed on the long term goal to apply Islamic values to 
the state, but they differed in their views of the appropriate strategy. 
For HT the application of syariah would impose Islamic values on 
society in a top down strategy. KAMMI adopted a bottom-up strategy 
of Islamization in which the party would attract support through its 
adherence to Islamic values and come to power through democratic 
means. 
The fourth stream was the Association of Inter-Campus Muslim 
Student Activists, which is abbreviated into HAMMAS. HAMMAS, 
which was established in October 1998 shortly after the fall of Suharto, 
claimed to have 10,000 members in August 1999, but this was most 
probably an over-estimate of its true strength. The name HAMMAS, 
chosen to declare militant support for Palestinians, reflects the militant 
and radical orientation of this stream of the dakwah movement.  
These organizations were established by a younger generation of 
Muslim students at secular universities, who came to maturity in the 
1980s and 1990s. They were disillusioned with the promise of the 
secular nation state to bring prosperity and greater social and economic 
justice. However, most of the above dakwah activists at campuses had 
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no Islamic studies background except for learning activities in their 
study group during their free time of academic programs. Since most 
of them were not students of Islamic universities, the subject matter in 
their study groups was not as sophisticated as in the groups of those 
who studied at Islamic higher educations, yet their determination to 
practice Islam in their daily life was strong. However, at Islamic 
university campuses the contrary, applied. There were major 
tendencies to learn and adopt modern Western thought and ideologies. 
At Indonesia Islamic University (UII) and the State Institute of Islamic 
Studies (IAIN) Yogyakarta, for example, groups of students were 
having intensive studies on communism, socialism, capitalism, 
secularism and other Western thought.  
Several points are worth noting here. Political oppression towards 
university students by the New Order regime was generally not 
effective. Instead, it became a vehicle for Muslim student mobilization. 
The embryos of the Islamic movement came not from Islamic 
university campuses, like IAIN and other Islamic universities or 
institutes. For this phenomenon Hefner provides several answers 1) 
there was an increase in literacy, which made studying and adherence 
to Islamic customs and practices more likely, 2) the official state 
education curriculum had a religious component to it so more people 
were exposed to formal religious ideas; 3) participation in organized 
religion was a relatively safe outlet for expression and it was a sphere 
of life not totally controlled by the state. In fact, by this time, there was 
even some space for religious groups to influence public policy.36 
However, it is no easy to explain why the existing study groups of the 
HMI (Muslim Student Association) and PMII (Indonesian Muslim 
Student Movement) played no significant role in the above student 
movements. Perhaps, the most likely explanation was that the HMI 
accepted Pancasila as the basis of their association, which implied that 
the association was already under the control of the New Order 
government.  
The Impact on Political Movements 
The impact of political oppression and depoliticization of Muslim 
organizations is another interesting point to note. From the study 
group or dakwah activities at university campuses the student activities 
                                                 
36 Hefner, Civil Islam, p. 16. 
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were steered toward political movement. Among the first political 
movements that stemmed from dakwah activities at university 
campuses were the Partai Keadilan37 and Hizbut Tahrir. The former 
was prepared to participate in the democratic process, whereas the 
latter refused to join such a political process because it came from the 
West. Another political party that arose from Islamic organizations (or 
parties) in the past was the Crescent and Star Party (Partai Bulan 
Bintang), which derived its ideas from Masyumi, the Islamic political 
party that was banned by Sukarno in 1960. Other parties established by 
Muslim intellectuals and clerics but adopting a secular platform were 
the Nation Awakening Party (PKB) and the National Mandate Party 
(PAN). In a free democratic parliamentary election in June 1999, forty-
eight parties competed for 462 contested seats of which Islamic parties 
gained 163.38  
Of those political movements the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan, PK) 
was perhaps the most sophisticated and promising Islamic party. It was 
set up shortly before the 1999 general elections. Several of its leaders 
were educated in the United States, Europe and the Middle East, 
among them. Nurmahmudi Ismail, the first President of the party, who 
was a graduate of Texas A&M University. He was later to become the 
Minister of Forestry in Abdurrachman Wahid’s administration. As we 
mentioned above, this party emerged from university student activities 
in various campuses since the 1980s. PK campaigners in 1999 stressed 
not the Islamic state but opposition to official corruption, their 
professional qualifications to govern, and an egalitarian economic 
policy balancing phased industrial development with self-sustaining 
agricultural growth. PK’s platform also proposed a sharper separation 
of executive, legislative, and judicial powers, with a Supreme Court no 
longer appointed by the president. The New York Times, 30, April, 
2002, took keen interest in the emergence of the Justice Party, 
especially in its mission to “restore a moral focus in a country that has 
fallen in chaos and widespread corruption”, 39 based on shariah (Islamic 
law).  
                                                 
37 Partai Keadilan is now known as Partai Kedilan Sejahtera (Justice and Welfare Party). 
38 What is meant by Islamic political parties could be Islam-base parties like PKS and 
PBB or parties established by Muslim leaders and supported by Islamic organization, 
like PKB and PAN. 
39 New York Times, 30 April 2002. 
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Though their basic approach to Islam was moderate, many PK 
activists did not have roots in any of the pre-existing modernist 
organizations, such as Muhammadiyah or the DDII (Dewan Dakwah 
Islamiyah Indonesian). PK thus represented something new in Indonesian 
politics. Most of the party’s voters were urban and were concentrated 
particularly in the neighborhoods around major universities, where 
many PK leaders were lecturers and researchers. In its first 
participation in the 1999 parliamentary vote, PK gained 1.4 percent of 
the vote (7 seats) but increased significantly in the 2004 election to 7.3 
percent, (45 seats).  
PKB (Nation Awakening Party) was founded in 1998 by the 
preeminent NU leader, Abdurrahman Wahid. PKB received 12 percent 
of the 1999 parliamentary vote (51 seats), but only 10.57 percent in 
2004 parliamentary vote (52 seats). Though founded by NU and 
supported by Muslim traditionalists, PKB’s formal ideological base is 
not Islam but Pancasila,40 adopting secularist policies in government. 
Membership of the party is open to non-Muslims, but few have joined. 
At the October 1999 session of the People’s Consultative Assembly 
Abdurrahman Wahid was elected as President of Indonesia by a 
coalition led by “Muslim” parties and leaders.41 Wahid’s presidency 
was seen as the first democratic transfer of power in Indonesian 
history.42 However, twenty months later, Wahid had been widely 
condemned as a failed leader. On July 23, 2001 he was impeached by 
the congress because of his inability to address continuing corruption 
at the highest levels, economic disorder, and separatist movements.43 
                                                 
40 The famous Indonesian five principles of Pancasila was first enunciated by Sukarno 
in 1945. 
41 General Election Commission of Indonesia, Analyzing Indonesia’s Election, 1999 
(Jakarta: Indonesian General Election Commission, 2001). See also, Dwight King, 
Half-Hearted Reform: Electoral Institutions and the Struggle for Democracy in Indonesia 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), see chapters 3 & 4 on the 1999 elections. 
42 It was through the support his party that Abdurrahman subsequently became 
Indonesia’s first democratically elected president defeating Megawati Soekarnoputri of 
PDI-P during the 1999 MPR session to vote president, serving from October 1999 to 
July 2001, MPR, Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or People’s Consultative Assembly, a 
kind of super-Parliament whose responsibilities until very recently included selection 
of the president and vice-president..  
43 Greg Barton, Gus Dur: The Authorized Biography of Abdurrahman Wahid (Jakarta: 
Equinox Publications, 2002). 
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Wahid had a reputation within Indonesia as a liberal thinker with a 
pluralistic outlook. It was probably due to this outlook and his 
authoritative approach that Wahid was defeated by Hasyim Muzadi in 
the election of the Chairman of NU at Boyolali in 2004 and by 
Muhaimin Iskandar in the internal dispute of PKB recently.  
Another Islamic party was The Crescent and Star Party (Partai 
Bulan Bintang, PBB). Established in 1999, and campaigning for an 
Islamic state, many of its leaders had family connections with Masyumi 
leaders of the 1950s. Given its tiny vote (2 percent = 13 seats in 1999 
and 2.62 = 11 seats in 2004), compared to Masyumi’s 21 percent in 
1955, PBB was considered by most observers to be a party of the past. 
Another party established during the New Order regime and 
supported by traditionalist Muslims was PPP (Unity Development 
Party). With Islam as its ideology, PPP won 10 percent of the 1999 
vote (46 seats), but gained a lower percentage in the 2004 election (8.15 
percent) at the same time, increasing its number of seats to 58.  
Another new party set up by Muslim activists was PAN (National 
Mandate Party). It was founded and led by Amien Rais,44 in 1998, and 
like PKB, PAN was founded as an open party with Pancasila as its 
ideology, and closely identified with modernists. Like Wahid, to attract 
both liberal or moderate Muslims and non-Muslims Amien Rais 
appeared to be committed to a pluralist vision. Nonetheless, the party  
failed to attract many liberal Muslims and non-Muslims. In 1999 PAN 
got only 7 percent of the vote. The party cultivated only 
Muhammadiyah and other modernist voters, while Amien Rais was 
defeated in the first round of presidential election. In the 2004 election, 
PAN’s share of the vote decreased form 7 percent to 6.44 percent, but 
its number of seats increased from 34 to 52. For the ideological basis 
of some prominent parties in Indonesia and their vote result from 
1955, 1999 and 2004 election see table 1.  
Although most of the parliamentary seats in the 1999 election were 
still dominated by the old parties established during Suharto regime,45 
                                                 
44 Amin Rais is an American-educated professor of international relations, who later 
on chaired the MPR In the 1990s Amien headed Muhammadiyah, the largest Muslim 
modernist social and educational organization. He is still the most prominent 
Muhammadiyah personality and modernist politician. 
45 The seat gained by PDI-P (Indonesian Democracy Party-Struggle), was 34 percent 
of the vote and 153 seats; Golkar, was 22 percent of the vote and 120 seats; PPP 
(Development Unity Party), was 10 percent and 58 seats. 
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Islamic political parties still gained almost 35 percent of the total seats. 
In the 2004 election the seats of Islamic parties increased significantly, 
while the secular parties got fewer votes, except Partai Demokrat, PD 
(Democrat Party), the party that brought Susilo Bambang Yodhoyono 
to the Presidency.   
Table 1: Indonesia’s Democratic Elections 1955, 1999 
and 2004. 
1955 Election % 1999 Election % Seats 2004 Election % Seats 
PNI; 
(Nationalist/ 
Sukarnoist 
ideology)  
22 PDI-P; 
(Nationalist/ 
Sukarnoist 
ideology)  
34 153 PDI-P; 
(Nationalist/ 
Sukarnoist 
ideology) 
18.53 109 
Masyumi; 
(Islamic 
ideology, mass 
base modernist 
and 
traditionalist 
Muslim) 
21 Golkar; 
(Universalist 
ideology, but 
mass 
predominantly 
modernist 
Muslim)  
22 120 Golkar; 
(Universalist 
ideology, but 
mass predomi-
nantly 
modernist 
Muslim)  
21.58 128 
NU or 
Nahdlatul 
Ulama; 
(Islamic 
ideology, mass 
base 
traditionalist 
Muslim)  
19 PKB;  
(Universalist 
ideology but 
mass 
predominantly 
NU, 
traditionalist 
Muslim)  
12 51 PKB; 
(Universalist 
ide ology but 
mass 
predominantly 
NU, 
traditionalist 
Muslim)  
10.57 52 
PKI; 
(Communist 
ideology, mass 
base 
syncretist/non 
–Muslim)  
17 PPP;  
(Islamic 
ideology, 
traditionalist 
and modernist 
Muslim)  
10 58 PPP;  
(Islamic 
ideology, 
traditionalist 
and modernist 
Muslim)  
8.15 58 
  PAN; 
(Universalist 
ideology, but 
mass 
predominantly 
modernist 
Muslim)  
7 34 PAN; 
(Universalist 
ideology, but 
mass 
predominantly 
modernist 
Muslim) 
6.44 52 
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  PBB;  
(Islamic 
ideology, mass 
modernist 
Muslim, 
successor to 
Masyumi) 
2 13 PBB;  
(Islamic 
ideology, mass 
modernist 
Muslim, 
successor to 
Masyumi) 
2.62 11 
  PK;  
(Islamic 
ideology, mass 
base Muslim 
but neither 
modernist nor 
traditionalist) 
1 7 PKS;  
(Islamic 
ideology, mass 
base Muslim 
but neither 
modernist nor 
traditionalist) 
7.34 45 
     PD;  
(Democratic 
Party, secular, 
nationalist)  
7.5 57 
     PDS; 
(Christian 
Ideology) 
1.60 12 
All other 
parties 21 
21 All other 
parties  
12  All other 
parties 
24.77 26 
Total  100 Total  100 462 Total 100 550 
Source : R. William Liddle, “New Patterns of Islamic Politics in 
Democratic Indonesia,” Asia Report Special Program, no. 110 (April 
2003), p. 5 
The phenomenon of the rise of Islamic political parties with an 
increased number of parliamentary seats from 1999 to 2004 suggests 
that the claim of neo-modernist liberal Muslim figure Nurcholish 
Madjid in early 70s “Islam yes Islamic party no” is no longer tenable. 
The statement was apparently intended to entertain the New Order 
government whose strategy was to depoliticize Muslim society. In fact, 
in the free democratic elections Muslims’ participation in political 
parties was manifest. There might be various factors involved in the 
rise of new Islamic base parties. It could be the outcome of the long-
suppressed political aspiration of Muslim society by authoritarian rule 
to enjoy space granted to them by democratic freedom. Another 
explanation, especially for the success of the PKS, was its campaign on 
a platform of good governance based on Islamic moral values. This 
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point was well-directed at a time when, for many people, the 
fundamental problem of government administration was cultural and 
moral weakness. The intrusion of the materialistic worldview of 
Western civilization into the Indonesian middle class brought about an 
incessant series of corruption cases in the government administration. 
The experience of other countries suggested that a state incapable of 
bringing about justice and prosperity was the best breeding ground for 
primordial sentiment, including Islam, to emerge. Unless the issue of 
social justice were addressed adequately, the spirit of radicalism that 
emerged from Muslims, non-Muslims or secularist Muslim activists 
would always challenge the government. In short, the advent of the 
“Justice and Welfare Party” (PKS), was welcomed by Indonesian 
people. It was known not only as an Islamic political party but also as a 
party with self-discipline, a gradual, peaceful approach to meeting 
reformist goals and commitment to end corruption. It also planned to 
be a pioneer in upholding Islamic values within a framework of 
national unity and integrity. Party activists, such as Hidayat Nur Wahid 
and Zulkiflimansyah, stated: 
We must work hard to ensure the real voice of Islam is 
heard in Indonesia and even in the world at large. We must 
speak out boldly in defense of a dynamic, moderate 
Islam—an Islam that upholds the sanctity of human life, 
reaches out to the oppressed, respects men and women 
alike, and insists on the fellowship of all humankind. Such 
is the true Islam of the Prophet, we believe, that some are 
now seeking to destroy.”46 
Unfortunately, many observers interpreted the rising tide of 
Islamic politics as a sign of Islam’s challenge to democracy or the rise 
of fundamentalism in politics. This interpretation may be deemed 
biased. So far those parties were still within the democratic sphere and 
had committed no political fraud. The rising Islamic tide should, 
therefore, be understood in terms of the democratic framework , since 
in the reformation era every citizen had a full right to participate in 
democracy regardless of his or her religion, race and ethnic group. 
Justice and Welfare Party (PKS) and other Islamic parties had a 
commitment to participate in democratic elections and bound 
                                                 
46 Hidayat Nur Wahid and Zulkiflimansyah, “The Justice Party and Democracy: A 
Journey of a Thousand Miles Starts with a Single Step,” Asia Program Special Report, no 
110 (April 2003), p. 20. 
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themselves to the democratic process, therefore there was no reason to 
suspect the outcome of the democratic process, or to refuse to 
acknowledge the democratic victory of an Islamic party, should that 
occur. Such a reaction would have risked the very principles of 
democracy, and would have been seriously counterproductive to the 
promotion of democracy. 
On the other hand, Islamic movements, like PKS, were challenged 
to shift from slogans to programs. They were required to maintain a 
balance between social activism and intellectual activism, and were 
urged to elaborate whole Islamic concepts, especially those which were 
urgently required by the current situation, such as tolerance, human 
right, justice, welfare and the like. They were required to become more 
self-critical, and speak out against un-Islamic practices in political and 
social affairs, both at national and international level, including 
corruption, oppression, acts of terrorism by extremists, and others.  
The Current Religious Cleavage 
The current political situation and its future could be best 
understood from an Islamic worldview by which we may sketch the 
position of every group in relation to Islam and to the Indonesian 
political setting. To deal with religious movements presupposes the 
understanding of religion, which is generally defined as a system of 
belief. A system of belief or religion can be seen as a mental 
phenomenon, dealing with the matter of believing, or a social 
phenomenon, concerning a feeling of belonging.47 However, in the 
present situation, a system of belief can be best seen as worldview. It is 
an integrated system of basic beliefs about the nature of ourselves, 
reality, and the meaning of existence.48 It is also defined as a belief, 
feeling and thought that functions as a motor of social and moral 
change.49  
To see Islam from a worldview perspective is to see the whole 
concept of Islam as system of belief and of social life. As a system of 
                                                 
47 Kenneth D. Wald and C. D. Smidt, “Measurement Strategies in the Study of 
Religion an Politics,” in David C. Leege (eds), Rediscovering the Religious Factor in American 
Politic (Aemonk, N.Y: R.E. Sharpe, 1993), p. 32.  
48 Thomas F Wall, Thinking Critically About Philosophical Problem, A Modern Introduction 
(Wadsworth, Australia: Thomson Learning, 2001), p. 532.  
49 Ninian Smart, Worldview, Cross Cultural Explorations of Human Belief (New York: 
Charles Sribner's sons, n.d.), pp. 1-2. 
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belief it embraces the belief that God’s revelation is preserved in the 
Qur’an, and that Muhammad’s words and deeds were collected in 
narrative reports or hadith attributed to the Prophet. The system of 
social life is to be found in these two sources of the Islamic worldview. 
Much of the content of the Qur’an concerns not only guidelines for 
worship, but also regulations governing marriage, inheritance, business 
contracts, criminal punishment, and the conduct of war. It is plausible 
therefore, that Prophet Muhammad was not only a religious leader, but 
also a chief executive, judge, and commander in-chief of the Medina 
state. He is he role model for Muslims, representing the all-embracing 
nature of the Islamic worldview. As a worldview, Islam provides 
guidelines for private and public lives, duties to God and duties to 
society. In Islamic civilization, religion occupies an important place in 
public life: in the ideology of state and its institutions and in the 
conduct of politics. Islam is incompatible with secularism or a secular 
worldview. Ideologically, the Islamic community (ummah) was a 
religio-political state or empire. Muslim rulers (caliphs or sultans), as 
Muhammad’s successors as head of state, were to assure government 
according to Islam and to spread and defend Islamic rule.50 In 
addition, Islam also gives full protection to other religions. They are 
permitted to practice their religion, to be governed by their own 
religious leaders, laws and courts, and they are also protected by 
Muslims from external aggression. No oppression or compulsion 
towards adherents of other religions to embrace Islam is allowed. 
Islam has developed ways to deal with other religions since it has a rich 
experience of living with other traditions, beliefs and religions. All 
these principles were practiced during the golden age of Islamic 
civilization from 7th until 19th century.  
There was, however, an essential modification in the understanding 
Islam due to the orientalist tradition of studying Islam. Likewise, a 
fundamental change in the practice of Islamic teaching took place 
under the pressure of colonialism. Esposito conspicuously states:  
By the late nineteenth and twenty centuries European legal 
codes had replaced Islamic and local customary laws. The 
political economic and legal penetration of Muslim 
societies by the West was further extended as modern 
                                                 
50 John L. Esposito (ed.), Islam in Asia (Oxford, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1987), 
see editor Introduction, pp. 12-13. 
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Western educational reforms were introduced. Traditional 
Political and religious elite saw their power, prestige and 
way of life (custom and values) progressively altered by 
new modern Western oriented classes of professional and 
technocrats. By twenty the century, the West reigned 
supreme, dominating much of the Islamic world politically 
and economically. Its impact on social and cultural life was 
no less threatening.51  
In fact, in some cases Western colonialism employed orientalists 
for their understanding and interpretation of Islam and Muslim society. 
Edward Said’s work suggests that orientalist understandings were 
generally colored with a Western worldview and political interest.52 In 
turn, such interpretations influenced some modernist Muslim 
intellectuals, especially those who studied at Western universities.  
From this situation at least two emerging religious orientations 
came to materialize, which developed into two lines of religious 
cleavage: one approving and adopting a Western Orientalist approach 
to Islam, the other resisting it. In Indonesia, during the Suharto regime, 
the former promoted secularism and rationalism, two important 
doctrines of modernism. After the fall of Suharto this group advocated 
postmodern doctrines, such as relativism, religious pluralism, nihilism, 
and the likes. These intellectuals were known among the Indonesian 
Muslims as liberal Muslims but they called themselves Liberal Islam 
(Islam Liberal). In contrast, the latter branch disseminated the spirit of 
Islamic revival and maintaining a traditional understanding of Islam. 
Some were against the West, but others were rationally critical of both 
Islam and the West. These two lines of religious cleavages were 
supportive of socio-political movements in today’s Indonesia.  
To use a fair and objective designation to depict Muslim 
movements in relation to an Islamic worldview and the present 
political situation, I avoid using the liberal-literal division. Instead, I 
would prefer to employ the terms “liberal” and “non-liberal”, since 
liberal-literal usually suggests that the former is positive, whereas the 
latter is negative. The word “liberal” is often associated with demo-
                                                 
51 Esposito, Islam, pp. 15-16. 
52 Edward Said identified three fundamental misunderstanding of the Orientalism in 
his work Orientalism, but to grasp directly the three point see Keith Windschuttle 
“Edward Said’s Orientalism revisited,” The New Criterion Vol. 17, No. 5, (January 1999), 
p. 5. 
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cratic, moderate, tolerant, humanistic, rational, whereas the word 
“literal” is not. Moreover, to place liberal vis a vis literal is to neglect the 
non-liberal and non-literal approaches to Islam which in turn might 
lead to the generalization that all Muslims are literalists, fundamen-
talists and terrorists. This, according to Esposito, tends to be 
misleading. He states that: 
To equate Islam and Islamic fundamentalism uncritically 
with extremism is to judge Islam only by those who wreak 
havoc--a standard not applied to Judaism and Christia-
nity...53 
Cheryl Bernard’s classification of Muslims into: fundamentalist, 
traditionalist, secularist and modernist54 also appears problematic, since 
it is hard to distinguish between fundamentalists and traditionalists, 
because as I mentioned above, Muhammadiyah is modernist but by no 
mean liberal, while NU is traditionalist and could be in a sense 
fundamentalist. The same is the case with Justice Party, which is 
modernist in a sense and fundamentalist in another. Similarly, in some 
cases there is an overlap between secularists and modernists. 
Therefore, the category of liberal and non-liberal would be more 
appropriate in relation to Islam.55 
The Non-Liberal groups 
A non-liberal approach to Islam refers to the Sunni > school of 
thought or Ahlussunnah wal Jama>‘ah, the largest school of thought 
adhered by Indonesian Muslims and Muslims in the wider  world. It is 
within this school that Maliki, Hanafi, Hanbali and Syafii schools of 
jurisprudence, as well as Asy‘ari and Maturidi schools of theology 
existed. Admittedly, there are various versions of Islamic teaching in 
this Sunni > group, such as the role of reason and revelation, various legal 
                                                 
53 John L. Esposito, “Political Islam: Beyond the Green Menace,” Originally published 
in the journal Current History, (January 1994). Cited from http://www.arches.uga.edu-
/~godlas/espo.html. Accessed on 25 September 2008. 
54 The modernist meant by Cheryl is in fact the liberalist. See Cheryl Bernard, Civil 
Democratic Islam, Partners, Resources and Strategies (Pittsburgh: RAND Corporation, 2003), 
pp. 44-55.  
55 Liddle divides the religious cleavage into Liberal and Islamist, but by Islamist he 
refer only to the radical group excluding the moderate one. See William Liddle, “New 
Patterns of Islamic Politics in Democratic Indonesia,” Asia Program Special Report, no. 
110, (April 2003).  
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decisions. Still, their diverse approaches are still within the ambit of the 
worldview of Islam.  
In the case of Indonesian Muslims the non-liberal approaches are 
divided into groups, each of which has its own particular interest. As 
was described above, among the largest groups or organizations are: 
Muhammadiyah, (emphasizes on social movements), Nahdatul Ulama or 
NU (maintaining traditional spirit of Islam), al-Irsyad (stressing on 
understanding Islam based on the Salafi school of thought), and 
traditional Islamic boarding schools, named Pesantren, spread all over 
Indonesia. All of those organizations and education institutions played 
a pivotal role in the struggle for Indonesia's independence and, in fact, 
militancy in Indonesia can be said to go back to the early attempts of 
these organizations and other Muslim organizations in the struggle 
against the Portuguese and later Dutch colonizers. After independence 
these organizations became a force for progressive political change, 
advocating religious tolerance, taking moderate positions, protecting 
civil rights, empowering women for social activities,56 and helping the 
poor. At the same time, they also promoted Islamic values, traditions 
and practices, and in some cases might advocate Islamic law, however, 
they were committed to working within the law, and as part of the 
political system to advance their goals.  
Be that as it may, voice of Islam in Indonesia is not represented 
only by these large, powerful, and moderate organizations. Other than 
those moderate organizations, historically, there were also “radical” 
movements in Indonesia whose membership in part consisted of 
Indonesian military and civilian combatants demobilized after the 
establishment of the Republic. An organization that has often been 
stigmatized as militant Islam in Indonesia is Da>rul Isla>m (DI). Da >rul 
Isla>m had its roots in separate rebellions in West Java, South Sulawesi 
and Aceh in the late 1940s and early 1950s. D.I sought to create an 
Islamic state, Negara Islam Indonesia (NII). In fact, the movements 
emerged due to a conflict that occurred between the military and 
Soekarno’s authoritarian strategy. But the military subsequently took 
refuge under the umbrella of Islam, declaring the establishment of a 
separate Islamic state. This became a strategic reason for the 
Indonesian Army during Suharto regime to be as highly suspicious of 
                                                 
56 For this purpose Muhammadiyah formed women organization named Aisyiah, while 
Nahdatul Ulama has Muslimat for women and Fatayat for female youths.  
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political Islam as it was of the communists.57 Such a suspicion was 
inappropriate for it included moderate Muslims in general. It is still too 
early to consider the present social and political movements as the 
reemergence of those radical and separatist movements (Da>rul Isla>m), 
and further research is needed into this question.58  
At present the groups which are usually dubbed fundamentalist in 
Indonesia are the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), the Mujahidin 
Council of Indonesia (MMI), Laskar Jihad, and one other group, 
known as Jama>‘ah Isla>miyah, which was accused of the October 2002 
bombings in Bali, followed in 2003 and 2004 by the bombings of the 
Marriott Hotel, and the Australian Embassy in Jakarta.  
The Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) is a group formed in 1998 and 
led by Habib Rizq, an Arab of Yemeni descent, who graduated from 
Umm al-Qura University and the University of Malaya, Malaysia. Its 
members are young uneducated activists  and partly the activists of 
various mosques. It is now considered one of the Muslim pressure 
groups in the country and, in October 2001, it was able to organize 
demonstrations of over 10,000 people in Jakarta.. The primary concern 
of this group is to act upon the Prophetic injunction that “Whoever 
observes an objectionable deed should change it with his hand, if he is 
powerless he should change it with his tongue, and if he is powerless 
he should change it with his heart, and that is the weakest faith” (al-
H}adi >th). In line with this, the targeted objects of FPI are public places 
that, for them, facilitate the practice of objectionable deeds (munkara>t) 
such as gambling dens, discos, nightclubs and bars that serve alcoholic 
beverages, and brothels. The objective of this group is that the Islamic 
law be applied in Muslim society in Indonesia, while Indonesia is 
regarded as the place of Muslim society. In many occasions Habib Rizq 
has acknowledged that he never wishes to use violence. Before he and 
his members force the closure of any forbidden places, he first takes 
legal procedures by warning the owner of those places to close their 
businesses, and then by asking the formal and written permission of 
                                                 
57 Further discussion about this see C. van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: the 
Darul Islam in Indonesia (Leiden: The Hague-Martinus Nijhoff, 1981). 
58 It is because Dijk explains that from 1977-1982 virtually the entire leadership of 
Darul Islam was arrested, while there are split and power struggles at the top. See Dijk, 
Ibid., and International Crisis Group, “Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam 
and the Australian Embassy Bombing,” Asia Report, No. 92, 22 February 2005. 
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police as well as the approval of the surrounding society for their 
actions. Nevertheless, he believes, in practice violent actions have to be 
taken.59  
Such a movement reminds us of the Hanbalite legal school of 
thought, founded by Ahmad ibn Hanbal, who claimed to be follower 
of Salaf. The characteristic of this school was its fanaticism and its 
frequent conflict with others without argumentation and 
demonstration, but only with act and deed. Their disagreement with a 
rational interpretation of the Qur’an was also a salient feature of the 
Salafi School. Their movement was simply to perform the Islamic 
obligation “to command the good and forbid the objectionable” (al-
amr bi al-ma‘ru >f wa al-nahy ‘an al-munka>r). Ibn Athir sketched this school 
as follows:  “…if they found female singers they would beat them and 
smash the music instruments; if they saw man, woman and children 
walking together they would ask their marital status. If they did not 
respond they would beat them and bring them to police office.”60 
Because of this attitude, according Abu Zahrah, people ran away from 
them.  
Another fundamentalist group is Laskar Jihad, which was formed 
in 1999 to support their Muslim brothers who were in conflict with 
Christians in Ambon, in the Maluku islands. The population of the 
region was almost evenly divided between Christians and Muslims, and 
no physical conflict had ever happened in the history of the region, but 
by June 2000, the newly established Laskar Jihad had sent 3,000 
members to Ambon. With the support of some Indonesian military 
officers, Laskar Jihad hoped to establish control over Ambon, thus 
encouraging the fundamentalist Christians to establish their long gone 
dream of a separate Christian state. While a settlement was reached on 
February 12, 2002 and a zone of neutrality established between the two 
sides, 5,000 people from both sides were slaughtered and 700,000 
people became refugees. However, this group is not well organized, 
has no formal structure, has no long term objectives or program.61 
                                                 
59 Personal discussion with Faried, one of FPI members, at Jakarta, on 23 August 
2003. 
60 Ibn Athir, “al-Ka>mil Fi al-Ta >rikh,” as quoted by M. Abu Zahrah, Tari>kh al-Madha >hib 
al-Isla>miyah fi al-Siya >sah wa al-Aqa >id wa Tari >kh al-Madha>hib al-Fiqhiyyah, vol. 2 (Al 
Qa >hiroh: Dar al-Fikri al-‘Arabi, 1987), p. 543. 
61 For a discussion of the creation of Laskar Jihad, see Noorhaidi Hasan, “Faith and 
Politics: The Rise of the Laskar Jihad in the Era of Transition in Indonesia,” Indonesia, 
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After the Maluku conflict, it disbanded its 15,000-member 
organization.  
Another group, regarded as the most radical Islamic group 
operating in Indonesia, is Jama>‘ah Isla>miyah (JI) with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir 
as its alleged leader. In fact, Ba’asyir had  already adopted an extreme 
position  back in the Suharto regime, during which he was against the 
use of national anthem and flag, Pancasila as the state principle and 
other national attributes. He was of the opinion that Indonesia should 
be an Islamic state and shari’a law should be applied. It was due to this 
position that he escaped to Malaysia in 1985 to avoid continued 
imprisonment by the Soeharto government. Returning to Indonesia in 
1999, Ba’asyir established the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI). 
According to Ba’asyir, “The MMI is an institution where a lot of 
people from a lot of Muslim groups including the NU and 
Muhammadiyah gather at one table to discuss how to get our vision of 
shari >‘a implemented into national laws. As long as Muslims are the 
majority, the country should be ruled by shari>‘a.”62  
A survey conducted in November 2002 by the Center for Study of 
Islam and Society (PPIM) at the State Islamic University in Jakarta 
showed that 71 percent of respondents supported the application of 
syariah (Islamic law) by the state to all Muslim men and women, and 
54 percent said that radical Islamist movements to implement syariah, 
such as the radical Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam 
(FPI) and Laskar Jihad) must be supported. While many people 
question the accuracy of the poll, almost everyone agrees that 
disillusion with secular democracy is growing and more people are 
turning to Islamist solutions. 
Nevertheless, all those radical movements do not represent all 
Muslim organizations and movements and proponents of radical Islam 
remain a small minority. Most devout practitioners of Islam who take 
moderate positions would never dream of using violence. It is only 
                                                                                                      
73 (April 2002), pp. 145-169. 
62 As quoted by Lawrence C. Reardon, “A Rational Choice Interpretation of Political 
Islam’s Challenge to Southeast Asia,” (Paper presented at the New England Political 
Science Association, Annual Meeting, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, 30 April 2004), p. 
13; see also Zachary Abuza, “MMI Concludes its first Congress Since the Release of 
Abu Bakar Ba’asyir,” Counterterrorism Blog, http://counterterrorismblog.org. 
Accessed on 06 July 2006. 
  
The Rise of Islamic Religious-political Movement 
367 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 02, Number 02, December 2008 
their extravagant activities, massive coverage by media of their 
activities, and the fierce response against their activities by their 
opponents, that create the image of the exaggerated influence of the 
radicals. The most extreme response is generally from the liberal group 
which takes liberal approach to Islam. Nevertheless, it is wise to be 
alert to the possibility of individuals making common cause with 
international criminals of whatever religious denomination.63  
The liberal Group 
The Liberal approach to Islam emerged only recently, almost at the 
same time as the rise of radical movement after the Reformation era, 
yet its roots are found in the secular notions of Nurcholish Madjid in 
1970s. Among the liberal groups is one called Liberal Islam. It was first 
enunciated in 1999, initiated by a group of Jakarta-based intellectuals 
led by Ulil Absar Abdalla, a graduate of Saudi Arabia Institute of 
Islamic Studies Jakarta (LIPPIA) and now of Emory University, and 
Luthfi Assyaukanie, graduate of University of Jordan and ISTAC 
Malaysia and later University of Melbourne Australia. Liberal Islam 
was known at first by the acronym “Islib”, but later in March 2002, the 
name was altered to the Liberal Islam Network (Jaringan Islam Liberal) 
so as to disseminate its views through the media networks. Islib 
originated from an intensive discussion group of young intellectuals at 
Paramadina University, a Jakarta-based university founded by 
Nurcholish Madjid. Since it was allegedly not welcomed by the 
university lecturers, they moved to Utan Kayu Street in East Jakarta 
under the support of Gunawan Muhammad, former editor in chief of 
TEMPO magazine.  
The movement became more intensive and came up with extreme 
ideas after the dramatic tragedy of 11/9. They established an active 
website (www.islamlib.com) and moderated chat groups, islam-
liberal@yahoogroups.com. Using these two media they debated issues, 
criticized current understanding of Islam, and cited the Koran to 
support their liberal arguments. In addition, members of “Liberal 
Islam” write a syndicated Sunday column published in the widely 
circulated Jawa Pos daily newspaper and forty regional newspapers 
including Riau Pos (Pekan Baru) and Fajar (Makassar). They also have a 
weekly talk show broadcasted every Thursday by Radio 68H and is 
                                                 
63 http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1765&I=1. 
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relayed by 20 other radio stations throughout Indonesia. They have 
formed the Liberal Islam Writers Syndicate and have published 
booklets and pamphlets on controversial issues such as jiha>d, shari >‘a 
and the establishment of houses of worship.64 Their agenda is to 
disseminate secularism, liberalism, emancipation, religious pluralism, 
gender and feminism, democratization, tolerance and human rights. 
Other than the “Liberal Islam Network” there are numerous newly 
established NGOs and study groups promoting the liberal thought. 
Among activists who disseminate liberal thought are the lecturers of 
State Islamic Universities (UIN) and State Institute of Islamic Studies 
(IAIN).  
The fundamental ideas held by “Liberal Islam” are parallel to 
religious liberalism that prevails in the West. It advocates a secular, 
relativist and rationalistic approach to Islam with special emphasis on 
liberal interpretation of the Qur’an. The principle looks simple and 
rational, but in the writing of its exponents in the media, books or 
journal articles, it becomes so extreme that it provokes a negative 
response from not only the radical groups but also the rest of the 
moderate Muslims. Among the points of dispute of the liberal 
principles that have created controversies and criticism are:65  
First, opening the gate of ijtihad for all aspects of Islam. This is not 
new for Sunni > Muslims, but ijtihad for all aspect of Islam is a 
controversial point. It is because in the history of Islam there was no 
ijtiha>d on the definite matter (muhkama>t) such as on the prohibition of 
alcoholic beverages, obligation of five times daily prayers, hajj 
pilgrimage, fasting, following the rules of inheritance (fara’id}) and the 
like. The liberals refer to no authority in their exercise of ijtiha >d. An 
example of their opinion is that some Indonesian liberal thinkers 
justify the practice of same-sex relationships (gays and lesbians),66 
                                                 
64 Santi W.E. Soekanto, “ ‘Liberal’ and ‘Literal’ Islam must sit and talk together,” The 
Jakarta Post, 1 March 2002; see also Adian Husaini & Nuim Hidayat, Islam Liberal, 
Sejarah, Konsepsi, Penyimpangan dan Jawabannya (Bandung: Gema Insani Press, 2002), p. 4. 
65 See Website of “Liberal Islam,” http://www.islib.com. 
66 Recently pronounced by Siti Musdah Mulia, is a feminist and was researcher in 
Research Development Bureau of Ministry of Religious Affairs, that lesbianism is 
legally allowed in Islam.  
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prohibit polygamy,67 and state other provocative opinions. These and 
other opinions not only  look unusual, but also are considered deviant 
among mainstream scholars (ulama). 
Second, giving an uncommon preference to contextual 
interpretation of the Qur’an; this principle is not always consistently 
followed, for when the text is against their ideas they interpret it 
contextually; conversely when the text agrees with their argument they 
take it literally. The most extreme outcome of this is that their 
emphasis on context leads them to denigrate the text and might result 
in the assumption that numbers of Qur’anic verses are irrelevant today. 
This position is intended to counter the literal interpretation of the 
Hanbalite school, but the drawback is that they only emphasize the 
contextual interpretation. The mainstream of Sunni > scholars maintain a 
balance between textual and contextual interpretations. This is a 
serious point of dispute with the liberal group. An unusual point 
among the scholars of Tafsir is that they employ a method of biblical 
hermeneutic common to Christian theologians to interpret 
contextually the Qur’anic text. The liberals hold that the science of 
Tafsir, constructed by Muslim scholars in the past, caused the moral, 
political and cultural decadence of the Muslims, a big claim that would 
put at risk the existing Islamic education institutions and is against the 
majority of Muslims scholars.  
Third, believing the relativity of truth. This principle leads to the 
belief that no one knows the true teaching of Islam, and no one knows 
the truth according to the will of God. Only God knows the absolute 
truth. Therefore, there is no claim of absolute truth. This principle is 
the foundation of religious pluralism, but liberal activists are disagreed 
over this issue. Some hold that pluralism is admitting the plurality of 
religions as religious tolerance,68 but some others argue that pluralism 
is a belief that all religions are different ways to God. The most crucial 
point, one which diametrically opposes the fundamental belief of the 
Muslims, is the assertion that Islam is not the only true religion and 
Allah is a name of God at an exoteric level, while there is another God 
                                                 
67 See Counter Legal Draft of Compilation of Islamic Law, compiled by a team chaired 
by Siti Musdah Mulia. 
68 H. Nuhrison M. Nuh, “Faham-faham Keagamaan Liberal di Kota Medan,” (Paper 
presented at a seminar on Liberal thought at Rural Communities, Research and 
Development Bureau , Ministry of Religious Affairs, 15 November, (2006), p. 12. 
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at an esoteric level. Therefore, they believe that all religions are true 
and the goal of worship in all religions is one that is towards The 
One.69 This idea is purely a derivation of John Hick’s conception of 
Global theology. In fact, pluralism is problematic not only for the 
Muslims but also for the adherents of Christianity.70 Thus, there is no 
clear definition of religious pluralism among the liberal proponents.  
Fourth, believing in the religious freedom. This principle is derived 
purely from the principle of religious liberalism, implying that full 
religious freedom means not only freedom to perform religious duties 
or to believe in one religion, but also freedom not to embrace any 
religion or freedom to become an atheist.71 In Islam one is free to 
embrace Islam or another religion, but once becoming a Muslim, he or 
she must perform religious duties. Indonesia is neither a religious nor a 
secular state, but atheism as adhered to by communism has no place, 
since it is against the first principle of Pancasila (Five Principles) i.e. 
“Belief in the Absolute One God” 
Another liberal principle is the idea of secularism, that is, to keep 
separate worldly and religious authority, and to keep religion out of 
politics. Many, if not most, aspects of social life, including the state, are 
outside the direct purview of religion. This idea might effectively 
prevent the idea of an Islamic state, but to isolate the socio-political 
activities of Muslims from their religious obligation is impossible. For 
the moderate Muslims no aspect of social life, most especially the state, 
is outside religion. The extreme position held by the exponents of the 
liberal group is their demand to abolish the Department of Religious 
Affairs and Ulama Council of Indonesia (MUI),72 for the two are 
                                                 
69 Statement of Nurcholis Madjid as quoted by Achmad Rosidi in “Liberal Masyarakat 
Kota Yogyakarta,” (Paper presented at a Seminar of Research Result about Liberalism 
Thought in Rural Community at Yogyakarta, 2006, held by Research and 
Development Bureau, Ministry of Religious Affair, Jakarta, November 2006, p. 31.  
70 Kenneth R. Samples, “The Challenge of Religious Pluralism,” in Christian Research 
Journal, Summer (1990), p. 39. 
71 Nicholas F. Gier, “Religious Liberalism and the Founding Fathers,” in Peter Caws 
(ed.), Two Centuries of Philosophy in America (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publishers, 1980), 
pp. 22-45.  
72 The idea was pronounced in a session of VIIth National Symposium of Human Right, 
held by National Commission of Human Right (KOMNAS HAM), Borobudur Hotel, 
Jakarta, 8-11 June, 2008.  
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symbols of integration of religion and state, placing religion as a 
question of public concern rather than a purely private matter.  
It is not hard to trace the origin of these liberal ideas. It was 
initially motivated by the spirit to respond to the Western notion of 
modernism. Among the early liberal Muslim thinkers in Indonesia 
were Harun Nasution and Nurcholish Madjid,73 both graduates of 
Western universities. However, other exponents like Masdar F. 
Mas’udi, Hussein Muhammad, Hamid Basyaib, Ulil Absar Abdalla, 
Luthfi Asysyaukani and others were not graduates of Western 
universities. Surprisingly, most of them were graduates of either 
traditional or modern religious schools (pesantren). However, there is an 
indication that the root of their liberal thoughts lay not in their creative 
and innovative understanding (ijtiha>d) of Islamic tradition, but in their 
attempts to apply an understanding of Postmodern Western thought to 
Islamic thought. Unsurprisingly the ideas of liberal exponents mostly 
perplexed students of traditional schools (pesantren), for there is no 
trace of such ideas in the Muslim intellectual tradition. This is the 
reason why liberal thought spread only among young Muslim scholars 
in big cities. Still, it had the effect of causing curiosity, criticism, hatred 
and confusion among the masses.  
US Involvement 
One of the most instrumental factors behind the spread of the 
liberal movement is financial support from the United States 
government. Most Indonesian Muslims, became aware of this  after 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The aim of the US 
government is not only to fight terrorists but also to change the 
Muslim world’s attitude towards the United States. The targets are the 
extreme Muslim activists or the “fundamentalists” in the Western 
sense of the word, who are regarded as contributing to terrorism. To 
crush terrorism and fundamentalism the US government gives 
financial support to NGOs and Muslim organizations to disseminate 
                                                 
73 Harun Nasution, the graduate of McGill Islamic Studies, Canada, and Nurcholish 
Madjid the Chicago University trained Islamic scholar, played a pivotal role in 
disseminating secularism, rationalism, religious pluralism and other fundamental ideas 
of liberalism. They were also known as scholars who promoted a version of Islam that 
was acceptable to New Order Government. See Malcolm Cone, “Neo-Modern Islam 
in Suharto’s Indonesia,” New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies, 4, 2 (December 2002), pp. 
52-67. 
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the idea of democracy, human rights, religious pluralism, moderation, 
modernity, civil society, gender equality, feminism and the like. US 
funds are used for broadcasting Islamic radio and TV shows, arranging 
democracy training, developing a curriculum in Muslim schools on 
civic education, holding seminars and meetings on civil education, and 
conducting other programs that promote liberal Islam.  
Several programs backed financially by the US can briefly 
mentioned here. For instance, USAID is actively involved in this 
sphere through such programs as the Muslim World Outreach and 
Engaging Muslim Civil Society Program. USAID funds also go 
through the Toyota Asia Foundation (TAF) to a wide range of 32 
organizations and institutions under its overarching program called 
Islam and Civil Society (ICS). It also collaborates with Muslim leaders 
and organizations to support democracy training and civil society 
development programs. These are offered at the State Islamic 
University in Jakarta and at Muhammadiyah University in Yogyakarta. 
Among other groups that it funds is ICP. It coordinates and financially 
supports JIL’s radio talk show on “Islam and Tolerance”. Likewise, it 
helps fund the female youth corps of Nahdlatul Ulama in establishing 
20 domestic violence counseling centers and women’s advocacy 
centers. It also provides financial assistance to Muhammadidyah and 
NU for a variety of educational initiatives. The program has 
contributed to strengthening its local Indonesian partners, and has 
widened a national conversation about democracy, human rights, and 
gender equality. However, USAID and the Asia Foundation never 
realize the impact of this liberalization movement on the non-liberal 
groups. Apart from political interest the most serious problems with 
liberal thought concern the fundamental aspects of Islamic teaching.  
Since the “Liberal Islam” stance often seems relatively 
unsympathetic towards mainstream Muslims, many Muslims have 
become suspicious of the liberal movement. This, in turn, has resulted 
in a significant decrease in the popularity of the US government under 
the Bush administration. One of the exponents of Liberal group 
admits that his liberal colleagues “are sometimes too direct in their 
approach, insensitive in many cases to the feelings of their fellow 
Muslims, and too selective in the themes and subjects they address…” 
and they depend too much on Western sources in defending their 
ideas, and therefore are identified with a Western agenda. In addition, 
the liberal exponents have a tendency to air controversial ideas through 
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the mass media, often pronounced in a subjective fashion and without 
prior studies of the religious text. These factors reduce the influence of 
their appeal and the prospects of liberal Islam in Indonesia.74 
Responses towards the liberal movement have been not only 
negative but sometimes filled with hatred and animosity. There are 
various kinds of response from activists, scholars, ulama, and public 
figures. For the non-liberal activists, “Liberal Islam” is anathema. 
Instead of adhering to the doctrines and teachings of Islam, the 
proponents of “Liberal Islam” are perceived as reinterpreting texts 
handed down by the Prophet to suit their own convenience. ‘Islib’ is 
regarded as a group of secularists who are spreading confusion and 
disinformation among the masses.75 Interestingly, the debate between 
the Muslim fundamentalists and liberals mirrors similar debates 
between Christian fundamentalists and liberals.  
In its 7th Congress the Council of Indonesian Ulamas (MUI, 
“Majlis Ulama Indonesia”), which took place in Jakarta in late July 
2005, issued a fatwa declaring religious liberalism, secularism, and 
religious pluralism as h}ara>m (forbidden), because these values are 
described as being incompatible with true Islam. In its statement, the 
council defines religious liberalism as Islamic thought that is not based 
on a religious foundation, but which instead subscribes to the absolute 
freedom of human intellectual capacity. Officially, the MUI fatwas 
have the backing of 26 Islamic organisations. These have, however, 
issued statements calling on the people to take up the fatwas in a 
considered and calm way, and to resolve any differences of opinion in 
a “civilised” manner through dialogues and encounters. This fatwa is a 
definite blow to the growing influence of progressive and liberal 
Muslim movements like the Liberal Islam Network (“Jaringan Islam 
Liberal”, JIL).  
According to Ma’ruf Amin, the chairman of the Fatwa 
Commission of MUI, the liberal movement has deviated from the 
teaching of Islam. First their method of thinking is not based on 
Islamic approaches; they have departed from the approaches settled by 
                                                 
74 M. Ihsan Alief, “Political Islam and Democracy: A Closer Look at the Liberal 
Muslims,” Asia Program Special Report, no. 110 (April 2003), p. 15.  
75 For criticisms of “Liberal” by supporters of non-liberal approach to Islam, see the 
website of the Indonesian Islam Information and Communications Centre 
(http://www.alislam.or.id). 
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ulama. Second, they consider the Qur’anic verses as irrelevant for 
today’s needs and therefore they modify their meaning to fit with the 
global situation. Furthermore, Ma’ruf denies that MUI has killed 
freedom and diversity by this fatwa. Rather, MUI only killed the 
deviation. “Ahmadiyah, secularism, pluralism and liberalism are not 
diversity in Islam, but deviation, since we have our own standards of 
tolerance.”76  
This resistance shown by moderate groups towards liberal 
proponents was exemplified by the election of Hasyim Muzadi as the 
chairman of Nahdatul Ulama, the defeat of the liberal Abdurrahman 
Wahid, and also the election of Din Syamsuddin, a non-liberal figure, 
as the chairman of Muhammadiyah organization. Open discourse with 
the liberal group in an academic atmosphere has also failed, due to 
their different approaches. The liberals interpret the texts with logical 
tool, while the non-liberals understand the texts with reason and 
authority. 
Conclusion  
The gulf that is growing between the supporters of a liberal 
interpretation of religion on the one hand, and fundamentalist, and 
radical Islamic currents on the other is quite dangerous for the future 
unity of the Indonesian nation, especially for the Muslims community. 
The two have taken up extreme standpoints, one condemning the 
other. The liberals blame not only the radical interpretation but attack 
almost the whole Islamic tradition including the fundamental teachings 
of Islam.  
I believe that militant Islamic groups do not have enough support 
to be considered a major threat to the stability and viability of 
Indonesian democracy, for the majority of Indonesian Muslims remain 
moderate. In the political sphere, elections and the democratic 
processes that have taken root since 1999 have offered hope for the 
Islamic parties, which gained votes in 2004 election not only because 
of their moderate causes, but also because of the outstanding 
performance and integrity of their members in the parliament.  Finally, 
it is safe to assert that the future of Islamic political parties will be in 
the hands of the moderate Muslims who uphold religious tolerance, 
                                                 
76 “Kampanye JIL Bukan Sekedar Wacana,” Hidayatullah, 1st Edition/XIX, Media, 
2006, Rabiuthani, 1427.  
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appreciate the diversity of races and religions, promote not only 
human rights but also human obligations to God, help the poor and 
cooperate with other nations in politics, economics, education and the 
social welfare of human beings. [] 
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